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STEPHEN I. VLADECK*t
On February 26, 2013, a 5-4 majority of the U.S. Supreme Court
held in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA1 that a coalition of
attorneys and human rights, labor, legal, and media organizations
lacked Article III standing to pursue their constitutional challenge to
section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).'
Section 702-the central innovation of the FISA Amendments Act of
2008 (FAA)-provided new statutory authorization for mass
electronic surveillance targeting communications of non-U.S. persons
reasonably believed to be outside the United States. And although
Congress expressly barred the use of section 702 to intentionally
target communications by U.S. persons,3 the plaintiffs in Clapper
alleged that the surveillance authorized by section 702 made it far
more likely that such communications would nevertheless be
intercepted. Given that section 702 requires no showing of
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2 Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 18oi et seq. (2008)).
Section 702 was added to FISA bythe FISAAmendments Act of 2008 (FAA), Pub. L. No.
110-261, § 101, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438-48 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2008)).
3See 50 U.S.C. § 188ia(b).
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individualized suspicion before such communications are obtained,4
the plaintiffs argued that it would therefore be unconstitutional.5
In rejecting the plaintiffs' standing to pursue such claims, Justice
Alito's opinion for the Clapper Court seized upon the secret nature of
the alleged governmental surveillance that the plaintiffs sought to
challenge.6 Because such secrecy prevented the plaintiffs from
showing that the government's interception of their communications
was "certainly impending," they could not establish the injury-in-fact
required by the Court's prior interpretations of Article III's case-or-
controversy requirement. At the time, the upshot of Justice Alito's
analysis seemed obvious: given that the actual implementation of such
surveillance authority is highly classified, it would be virtually
impossible for any individual to ever satisfy the "certainly impending"
standard that his majority opinion articulates. Clapper thereby
appeared to insulate the government's secret surveillance programs-
under section 702 or otherwise-from all external judicial challenge. 8
In retrospect, the timing of the Supreme Court's decision in
Clapper was more than a little ironic. Less than three months later,
the Washington Post published details on the hitherto-secret
"PRISM" program, pursuant to which the government, acting under
section 702, has been "tapping directly into the central servers of nine
leading U.S. Internet companies, extracting audio and video chats,
photographs, e-mails, documents, and connection logs."9 And another
Snowden-based story from late October revealed that "[t]he National
4 See id. §§ 1881a(a), (g).
5 See Amnesty Int'l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 2011), rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 1138.
6 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1148 ("[R]espondents have no actual knowledge of the
Government's § 1881a targeting practices. Instead, respondents merely speculate and make
assumptions about whether their communications with their foreign contacts will be
acquired under § 1881a.").
7Id. at 1148-49 & n.4.
8The statute does allow "electronic communication service providers" that receive section
702 directives from the government to object via in camera proceedings before the FISA
Court-and to appeal adverse decisions to the FISA Court of Review and Supreme Court,
where necessary. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(h)(4), (6). To date, however, no recipient of
section 702 directives appears to have availed itself of such an opportunity. See Letter from
Hon. Reggie B. Walton, Presiding Judge, FISC, to Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Sen.
Comm. on the Judiciary, at 8-9 (July 29, 2013), available at
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/download/honorable-patrick-j-leahy.
9 Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S.
Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST, June 6, 2013, at Ai.
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Security Agency has secretly broken into the main communications
links that connect Yahoo and Google data centers around the world." 10
One can certainly question whether Clapper would have come out
the same way if these stories had broken prior to the Court's
decision." And yet, although these disclosures seem to give even
greater credence to the plaintiffs' allegations in Clapper, they don't
necessarily cure the standing defect identified by Justice Alito. After
all, plaintiffs still can't identify specific communications of theirs that
have been obtained by the government under PRISM. Moreover, even
in the analogous context of the telephony metadata program under
section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act,12 where the FISA Court orders
disclosed by Edward Snowden included one identifying a specific
phone company (Verizon) that has been turning over all of its
business customers' metadata,1 3 the government has continued to
argue that parties don't have standing to challenge such collection
unless they can demonstrate not just that the government is obtaining
their data, but that it is using it, as well.1 4 As of this writing, at least,
those arguments have proven unavailing. 5
10 Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data Centers
Worldwide, Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2013, at Ai; see also Barton
Gellman et al., How We Know the NSA Had Access to Internal Google and Yahoo Cloud
Data, WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (Nov. 4, 2013),
http://wwv.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/11/04/how-we-know-the-
nsa-had-access-to-internal-google-and-yahoo-cloud-data.
11 See, e.g., Steve Vladeck, The VerizonlSection 215 Order and the Clapper Mindset,
LAWFARE (June 5, 2013, 11:OO p.m.), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2o13/o6/the-
verizonsection-215-order-and-the-clapper-mindset; see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Big Data
Before and After Snowden, 7 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 333 (2014).
12 Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215,
115 Stat. 272, 287 (2001) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2oo6)).
13See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible
Things from Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc., No. 13-8o (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013),
available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2o13/jun/o6/verizon-
telephone-data-court-order.
14 See, e.g., Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint at 11-14, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) [hereinafter
ACLU Motion to Dismiss].
15 Thus, although two district courts have divided on whether the metadata program is
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, both upheld the standing of different Verizon
customers to bring such a claim. See ACLU, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 735-38; Klayman v.
Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 26-29 (D.D.C. 2013).
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But whatever the ultimate merits of the government's view, 16 it
remains unlikely as a general matter that the Snowden disclosures, by
themselves, will have more than a frictional effect upon the ability of
most whose communications are intercepted under secret government
surveillance programs to challenge such surveillance in court. Instead,
the far more interesting question is how the relationship between
standing and secret surveillance fits into the more structural reforms
Congress is currently considering with regard to improving
accountability mechanisms in these contexts. Put another way, does
Justice Alito's logic compel the conclusion that Article III prevents
Congress from "fixing" Clapper, as it were (by relaxing the restrictive
standing rule that Justice Alito's majority opinion articulates), or from
otherwise providing for more vigorous judicial review of secret
surveillance programs?
On the surface, the answer to this question appears to be "yes."
Under the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife,17 Congress lacks the power to confer standing upon plaintiffs
beyond that which Article III permits.18 As Justice Scalia wrote for the
Lujan majority, "Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at
the invitation of Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury requirement
described in our cases, they would be discarding a principle
fundamental to the separate and distinct constitutional role of the
Third Branch." 19
Upon closer consideration, however, Lujan is not as clear-cut as it
is often portrayed. After all, Justices Kennedy and Souter-whose
votes were necessary to the result-saw the issue more narrowly. "In
my view," Kennedy wrote for the pair, "Congress has the power to
define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a
case or controversy where none existed before."20 The key is that
"Congress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to
i6 Given subsequent stories that the government is collecting less than 20% of domestic
telephony metadata, see Siobhan Gorman, NSA Collects 20% or Less of U.S. Call Data,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2014, at Ai, the Clapper argument may well resurface on appeal. After
all, there is nothing in the Snowden disclosures that would allow a specific plaintiff to
demonstrate that their phone records, specifically, were disclosed. Only if it must follow, as
Judge Leon concluded in Klayman, that the government has collected all such records
would there be no standing problem.
17504 U.S. 555 (1992).
18 Id. at 578.
19 Id. at 576.
2OId. at 58o (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring
S~t,,21suit. ' 2
In this symposium essay, I aim to explore the potential
implications of Justice Kennedy's broader understanding of
Congress's power to confer standing for judicial review of secret
surveillance programs going forward. After introducing the Lujan and
Clapper decisions in Part I, Part II then addresses one possible
implication-that Congress could respond to Clapper by expressly
lowering the threshold that plaintiffs must surmount in private
lawsuits challenging secret surveillance. As Part II concludes, it
probably would not offend the reasoning of Justice Kennedy's Lujan
concurrence for Congress to authorize challenges to secret
surveillance programs so long as plaintiffs could show that there was a
"reasonable likelihood" that their communications would be
intercepted by the government.
Of course, such a conclusion is without regard to the merits of
such challenges, but it would suggest that suits like Clapper could
indeed go forward-allowing courts to reach the difficult statutory and
constitutional questions that their merits present. As Part II
concludes, though, even if the constitutional validity of such a solution
seems clear, there are reasons to doubt its long-term utility and
efficacy.
With that in mind, Part III considers an alternative possibility-
that, instead of empowering individuals like the Clapper plaintiffs to
bring civil suits challenging secret government surveillance programs
(which may very well defeat the purpose of secret surveillance),
Congress might provide for greater (secret) adversarial process before
the FISA Court itself. As Part III explains, such reforms would raise no
new Article III concerns in the FISA Court, but would trigger difficult
questions about standing to appeal-especially after and in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in the Proposition 8 case. Thus, for
policymakers interested in increasing judicial review of secret
government surveillance programs, the most logical (if imperfect)
course may well be to pursue some combination of both measures-
allowing parties to sue in those rare cases when sufficient evidence of
their putative injuries has become public; and providing for more
adversarial process in cases in which it has not.
21Id.
22 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
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I. ARTICLE III STANDING, CONGRESS, AND CLAPPER
It is familiar sledding that, throughout the 1970s and 198os, the
Supreme Court read into the case-or-controversy requirement of
Article III of the Constitution ever-stricter requirements for
establishing standing, especially to vindicate claims not recognized at
common law.23 Whatever prompted this shift in the Court's
24jurisprudence, it was settled doctrine by the end of the 198os that
plaintiffs must establish "injury in fact," "causation," and
"redressability" in order to have Article III standing to sue.25 The one
big question that the Justices had yet to answer was how much
latitude Congress possessed to define those elements, especially when
creating federal statutory causes of action for injuries arising largely-
if not entirely-under federal law.
A. Lujan: Justice Scalia vs. Justice Kennedy
The Court answered that question in 1992 in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife.26 At issue was the citizen-suit provision of the Endangered
Species Act of 1973, which provided that "any person may commence
a civil suit on his own behalf.., to enjoin any person, including the
United States and any other governmental instrumentality or
agency... who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this
chapter. '' 27 In Lujan, a host of environmental groups invoked that
provision to challenge a new federal regulation that rescinded the
applicability of various ESA procedural requirements to new federal
projects overseas.
Writing for a 6-3 majority, Justice Scalia first rejected the
argument that the plaintiffs had alleged an "injury in fact" sufficient to
23See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988); Cass
R. Sunstein, Hhat's Standing After Lujan?: Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91
MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992).
24 See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 114 (6th ed. 2009) (summarizing competing "sources of strain" that
may have helped to precipitate modern standing doctrine).
25 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
26 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
27 Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 11, 87 Stat. 897 (1973) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(g)(1)(A)(2oo6)).
28Although seven Justices joined in the judgment, Justice Stevens did so only on the
merits; like the dissenters, he disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the plaintiffs
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satisfy Article III. As he explained, the plaintiffs had failed to show
that any of their members were specifically planning to visit the
overseas facilities where the new regulation would have had the
allegedly deleterious effect, and so could not demonstrate that they
were likely to incur a concrete, individualized injury as a result of the
challenged administrative action. For a four-Justice plurality, Scalia
also concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy Article III's
redressability requirement: "Instead of attacking the separate
decisions to fund particular projects allegedly causing them harm,
respondents chose to challenge a more generalized level of
Government action (rules regarding consultation), the invalidation of
which would affect all overseas projects. ', 29
But the heart of Justice Scalia's opinion was Part IV, in which he
explained (at least formally for the majority) that the citizen-suit
provision of the ESA could not constitutionally cure either of these
defects. As he wrote,
[T]here is absolutely no basis for making the Article III
inquiry turn on the source of the asserted right.
Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the
invitation of Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury
requirement described in our cases, they would be
discarding a principle fundamental to the separate and
distinct constitutional role of the Third Branch-one of
the essential elements that identifies those "Cases" and
"Controversies" that are the business of the courts
rather than of the political branches.30
Lujan thereby held that Congress had violated Article III in the
ESA by purporting to confer standing upon those who could not
satisfy the Court's three-pronged interpretation of the Constitution's
case-or-controversy requirement. To be sure, Justice Scalia
concluded, "[Statutory] broadening [of] the categories of injury that
may be alleged in support of standing is a different matter from
abandoning the requirement that the party seeking review must
himself have suffered an injury. ''3 1 But even in the former set of cases,
lacked standing to proceed. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 581-82 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 589-6o6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
29 Id. at 568 (plurality opinion).
30 Id. at 576 (majority opinion).
31Id. at 578 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972)) (alterations in
original).
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Justice Scalia's opinion for the Lujan Court ap eared to portend fairly
sharp limits on Congress's power to so provide.
And yet, whereas Part IV of Justice Scalia's opinion in Lujan was
nominally for a six-Justice majority, Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion-in which Justice Souter joined in full-offered a somewhat
narrower understanding of the constitutional limits that the case-or-
controversy requirement imposes on Congress.33 Justice Kennedy
agreed that it would violate Article III "if, at the behest of Congress
and in the absence of any showing of concrete injury, we were to
entertain citizen suits to vindicate the public's nonconcrete interest in
the proper administration of the laws., 34 At the same time, he was
equally clear that, "As Government programs and policies become
more complex and far-reaching, we must be sensitive to the
articulation of new rights of action that do not have clear analogs in
our common-law tradition., 35 Unlike the general skepticism of broad
statutory standing provisions evinced by Justice Scalia, the key for
Justice Kennedy was that "the party bringing suit must show that the
action injures him in a concrete and personal way."36 Thus, the upshot
of Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion was that Congress did have
fairly wide discretion to create an injury sufficiently concrete to satisfy
Article III where one previously had not existed; it had just exceeded
its limits in the ESA.
B. After Lujan
Although the distinction between Justice Scalia's majority opinion
and Justice Kennedy's concurrence may at first have appeared
semantic, the Court's subsequent jurisprudence illuminated both that
32 In an influential speech, then-Judge Scalia had already previewed his view of the strict
limits that the Constitution imposes on Congress's power to confer standing. See Antonin
Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983).
33Lujan, 504 U.S at 579-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring). With respect to Part IV of Justice
Scalia's opinion, Kennedy flagged that he joined it "with the following observations." Id. at
58o; see also, Amason v. Kangaroo Exp., No. 09-2117, 2013 WL 987935, at *3 n.5 (N.D.
Ala. Mar. 11, 2013) ("Because a majority opinion in Lujan is made possible only by
counting Justice Kennedy's concurrence, its consideration is important in interpreting the
holding of Lujan.").
34Lujan, 504 U.S. at 58o-81.
35 Id. at 580.
36 Id. at 581.
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(1) there truly is daylight between Justice Kennedy's and Justice
Scalia's view of Congress's power to confer standing; and (2) Lujan
was an outlier-one of the only cases in which Congress exceeded the
wide latitude Justice Kennedy believes it possesses to confer standing
upon plaintiffs who might not otherwise be entitled to sue to vindicate
certain statutory and constitutional injuries.
For example, in FEC v. Akins,37 Justice Breyer (writing for a 6-3
majority that included Justice Kennedy) found no Article III problem
with the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 38 even though
it authorized any person to challenge alleged violations of the statute
in the Federal Election Commission, and then to bring suit if the FEC
dismissed their complaint.39 In Akins, the plaintiffs challenged the
FEC's determination that the American-Israel Public Affairs
Committee (AIPAC) was not a "political committee," and was
therefore not required to comply with various disclosure regulations
and public reporting requirements. 4° Notwithstanding a sharply
worded dissent from Justice Scalia,41 the Court held that "the
informational injury at issue here, directly related to voting, the most
basic of political rights, is sufficiently concrete and specific such that
the fact that it is widely shared does not deprive Congress of
constitutional power to authorize its vindication in the federal
courts.,
42
Two years later, the Court in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. upheld the standing of
environmental plaintiffs who brought suit under the citizen-suit
provision of the Clean Water Act 43 claiming that a permitted business
was violating the Act's mercury discharge limits. 4 Focusing on the
distinction between "injury to the environment" and "injury to the
37524 U.S. 11 (1998).
38 Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431-457
(2012)).
39 See 2 U.S.C. 99 437g(a)(1), (a)(8)(A).
40 See id. § 431(4)(a).
41See, e.g., Akins, 514 U.S. at 29-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ('The provision of law at issue
in this case is an extraordinary one, conferring upon a private person the ability to bring an
Executive agency into court to compel its enforcement of the law against a third party.").
42 Id. at 24-25 (majority opinion).
4333 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2012).
44528 U.S. 167 (2000).
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plaintiff,,45 Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion highlighted the
injuries alleged by various members of Friends of the Earth. 6 Because
these injuries were concrete and specific, the Court held that they
were sufficient to satisfy Article III standing.47
In a short concurrence, Justice Kennedy flagged the "[d]ifficult
and fundamental questions [that] are raised when we ask whether
exactions of public fines by private litigants, and the delegation of
Executive power which might be inferable from the authorization, are
permissible in view of the responsibilities [constitutionally]
committed to the Executive., 48 But he nevertheless joined the
majority, as opposed to Justice Scalia's dissent, which concluded that
"[t]he undesirable and unconstitutional consequence of today's
decision is to place the immense power of suing to enforce the public
laws in private hands. " 49
Finally, in Massachusetts v. EPA, a 5-4 majority (again including
Justice Kennedy) held that a state had standing to sue the
Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean Air Act to
challenge its failure to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor
vehicles.5 1 Although some elements of Justice Stevens's analysis
appeared to turn on the "special solicitude" owed to states as
plaintiffs, 2 Justice Stevens also emphasized the critical role of
Congress-expressly invoking Justice Kennedy's views: "The parties'
dispute turns on the proper construction of a congressional statute, a
question eminently suitable to resolution in federal court. Congress
has moreover authorized this type of challenge to EPA action. That
45 Id. at 181.
46 See id. at 181-83.
47See id. at 183-88.
481d. at 197 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
49Id. at 215 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50549 U.S. 497 (2007).
51 See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012) (authorizing judicial review of "any... nationally
applicable regulations promulgated, or final action taken, by the Administrator").
52 See Stephen I. Vladeck, States'Rights and State Standing, 46 U. RICH. L. REv. 845, 856-
57 (2012) (situating Massachusetts within a broader array of decisions in which the
Supreme Court has recognized state standing when states are suing to enforce their federal
rights, as opposed to the rights of their citizens).
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authorization is of critical importance to the standing inquiry. 5 3
Notwithstanding a stern dissent from Chief Justice Roberts (joined by,
among others, Justice Scalia), the Court thereby allowed
Massachusetts' challenge to go forward5 4
To be sure, as the Court's most recent environmental standing
case-Summers v. Earth Island Institute5 5-attests, Justices Scalia
and Kennedy are still often on the same side in Article III standing
cases, even those raising Congress's power to create standing where
none previously existed. But even in Summers, Justice Kennedy wrote
a separate concurrence to explain that he was joining Justice Scalia's
majority opinion only because he agreed that "deprivation of a
procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the
deprivation-a procedural right in vacuo-is insufficient to create
Article III standing.,5 6 As he elaborated, "This case would present
different considerations if Congress had sought to provide redress for
a concrete injury 'giv[ing] rise to a case or controversy where none
existed before.' Nothing in the statute at issue here, however, indicates
Congress intended to identify or confer some interest separate and
apart from a procedural right.,
5 7
53 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 516 (citation omitted). The remainder of the
paragraph (and most of the next page) quoted from Justice Kennedy's Lujan concurrence.
See id. at 516-17 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 58o (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
54Id. at 535-49 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia penned a separate dissent-albeit
on the merits. See id. at 549-6o (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55 555 U.S. 488 (2009). Specifically, Summers held that environmental organizations
lacked standing to sue the U.S. Forest Service in order to enjoin application of regulations
to exempt certain timber from the notice, comment, and appeal process set forth in the
Forest Service Decisionmaking and Appeals Reform Act. Although the Act authorized such
claims, Justice Scalia's majority opinion stressed that:
It makes no difference that the procedural right has been accorded by Congress.
That can loosen the strictures of the redressability prong of our standing
inquiry-so that standing existed with regard to the Burnt Ridge Project, for
example, despite the possibility that Earth Island's allegedly guaranteed right to
comment would not be successful in persuading the Forest Service to avoid
impairment of Earth Island's concrete interests. Unlike redressability, however,
the requirement of injury in fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that
cannot be removed by statute.
Id. at 497 (citations omitted).
56Id. at 501 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 58o (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (alteration in original)).
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Akins, Friends of the Earth, Massachusetts, and Summers all
dealt with Congress's power to define "injuries" on terms more
capacious than those that courts would otherwise have identified, as
opposed to Congress's power to define the burden of proof plaintiffs
must satisfy in order to establish an injury in fact. But Justice
Kennedy's Lujan concurrence stressed Congress's power to both
"define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to
a case or controversy where none existed before." It should follow that
Congress's power to articulate chains of causation includes Congress's
power to legislate the means pursuant to which plaintiffs may
demonstrate that such chains exist. There has not yet been a post-
Lujan case testing this proposition, however-perhaps because
Congress has not been impelled to so provide in any post-Lujan
statute.
C. Clapper
Unlike the cases surveyed above, the lawsuit that gave rise to the
Supreme Court's Clapper decision was not seeking to take advantage
of a citizen-suit provision in a federal statute. Instead, Clapper
involved a fairly conventional constitutional challenge to an
unconventional statute-the FISA Amendments Act of 20o8.58 The
origins and history of the FAA have been well-described elsewhere;
59
for present purposes, it suffices to highlight the FAA's centerpiece,
new section 702 of FISA. As Justice Alito summarized in Clapper, that
provision
supplements pre-existing FISA authority by creating a
new framework under which the Government may seek
the FISC's authorization of certain foreign intelligence
surveillance targeting the communications of non-U.S.
persons located abroad. Unlike traditional FISA
surveillance, § 1881a does not require the Government
to demonstrate probable cause that the target of the
electronic surveillance is a foreign power or agent of a
foreign power. And, unlike traditional FISA, § 1881a
58 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act of 2oo8, Pub. L. No. 110-261, §
101, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438-48 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881-1881g (2008)).
59 See, e.g., 1 DAVID KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND
PROSECUTIONS §§ 9:11, 17:3 (2d ed. 2012); see also Stephanie Cooper Blum, What Really is
at Stake With the FISA Amendments Act of 2oo8 and Ideas for Future Surveillance
Reform, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 269 (2009).
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does not require the Government to specify the nature
and location of each of the particular facilities or places
at which the electronic surveillance will occur.60
Section 702 makes clear that the authorized surveillance cannot be
undertaken with the intent or purpose of targeting U.S. persons. 6 1 But
insofar as section 702 contemplates the sweeping and undifferentiated
interception of a high volume of electronic communications, it is
certainly at least possible-if not likely-that communications of U.S.
persons will be intercepted notwithstanding such statutory
constraints.
With that in mind, a group of plaintiffs who routinely
communicate with non-citizens outside the United States brought suit
on the day the FISA Amendments Act was signed into law, challenging
section 702 on a host of constitutional grounds. Foremost among
these was the claim that the statute violated the Fourth Amendment
insofar as it authorized the knowing interception of U.S. persons'
communications without a warrant and/or probable cause. 2 And
because fear of such interception had led the plaintiffs to take concrete
steps to communicate through alternative channels, they claimed that
section 702 thereby caused an "injury-in-fact" sufficient to confer
Article III standing.
In August 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York disagreed.64 Relying on an earlier Sixth Circuit decision
6o Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1144 (2013) (citations omitted).
61See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b).
62 To be clear, the Fourth Amendment argument is hardly open-and-shut. The FISA Court
of Review, for example, has recognized a "foreign intelligence surveillance" exception to the
Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause, see In re Directives [Redacted] Pursuant to Section
105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2oo8),
which, if valid, would arguably encompass all surveillance conducted under section 702.
Even if such an exception does not encompass interception of U.S. persons'
communications, courts have held in other contexts that the "incidental" interception of
protected communications as part of otherwise valid surveillance does not violate the
Fourth Amendment. But see United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 280-82
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (questioning the applicability of this rule in cases in which the "incidental"
interception is not unanticipated). The relevant point for present purposes is simply that
the claim in Clapper raised a serious constitutional question-regardless of its answer.
63See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Amnesty Int'l USA v. McConnell,
646 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. o8-civ-6259), available at
https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/natsec/amnesty/o7_ lo 2oo8Complaint.pdf.
64McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633.
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concluding that similar plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the
warrantless "Terrorist Surveillance Program, ''65 Judge Koeltl held that
Article III standing was absent because section 702 did not (1) directly
regulate or proscribe the plaintiffs' conduct; or (2) authorize
surveillance of a class of persons that included the plaintiffs.66
Eighteen months later, the Second Circuit reversed.67 As Judge
Lynch wrote for a unanimous three-judge panel:
[T]he plaintiffs here have alleged that they reasonably
anticipate direct injury from the enactment of the FAA
because, unlike most Americans, they engage in
legitimate professional activities that make it
reasonably likely that their privacy will be invaded and
their conversations overheard-unconstitutionally, or
so they argue-as a result of the surveillance newly
authorized by the FAA, and that they have already
suffered tangible, indirect injury due to the reasonable
steps they have undertaken to avoid such overhearing,
which would impair their ability to carry out those
activities.68
The government subsequently sought rehearing en banc, only to
have the Second Circuit divide 6-6-and thereby leave the panel
decision intact.69 Granting the government's ensuing petition for
certiorari,70 the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding
that the plaintiffs had failed to carry the Article III standing burden.
65 See ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007).
66McCounell, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 645-58.
67Amnesty Int'l USAv. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2011).
68 Id. at 149.
69 Amnesty Int'l USA v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 20 11) (mem.). The six dissenting
judges penned four separate opinions explicating their reasons for dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en bane. See id. at 172 (Raggi, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
bane); id. at 193 (Livingston, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane); id. at 200
(Jacobs, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane); id. at 204 (Hall, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en bane). The dissents prompted a concurrence from Judge
Lynch-the author of the panel opinion and the only member of the panel entitled to
participate in the en bane proceedings. See id. at 164 (Lynch, J., concurring in the denial of
rehearing en bane).
70 Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012) (mem.).
71 Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
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As noted above, at the heart of Justice Alito's opinion for a 5-4
majority in Clapper was the plaintiffs' inability to show that their
communications were being (or would be) intercepted pursuant to
surveillance undertaken under section 702. As he explained:
Respondents assert that they can establish injury in
fact that is fairly traceable to § 1881a because there is
an objectively reasonable likelihood that their
communications with their foreign contacts will be
intercepted under § 1881a at some point in the future.
This argument fails. As an initial matter, the Second
Circuit's "objectively reasonable likelihood" standard is
inconsistent with our requirement that "threatened
injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury
in fact." Furthermore, respondents' argument rests on
their highly speculative fear that: (1) the Government
will decide to target the communications of non-U.S.
persons with whom they communicate; (2) in doing so,
the Government will choose to invoke its authority
under § 1881a rather than utilizing another method of
surveillance; (3) the Article III judges who serve on the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court will conclude
that the Government's proposed surveillance
procedures satisfy § 1881a's many safeguards and are
consistent with the Fourth Amendment; (4) the
Government will succeed in intercepting the
communications of respondents' contacts; and (5)
respondents will be parties to the particular
communications that the Government intercepts. As
discussed below, respondents' theory of standing,
which relies on a highly attenuated chain of
possibilities, does not satisfy the requirement that
threatened injury must be certainly impending.72
Of course, the only reason why the plaintiffs' allegations in this
regard were so "highly speculative" was because the government's
surveillance operations under section 702 were (and largely remain)
secret. As Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent, the surveillance
alleged by the plaintiffs "is as likely to take place as are most future
events that commonsense inference and ordinary knowledge of
721d. at 1147-48 (citations omitted).
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human nature tell us will happen., 73 In any event, the real flaw with
the majority opinion, Breyer argued, was its adoption of the "certainly
impending" standard. In his words, "certainty is not, and never has
been, the touchstone of standing. The future is inherently uncertain."
Instead, "what the Constitution requires is something more akin to
'reasonable probability' or 'high probability.' The use of some such
standard is all that is necessary here to ensure the actual concrete
injury that the Constitution demands., 74
D. After Clapper (and Snowden)
The Supreme Court's decision in Clapper may well have sounded
the death knell for suits challenging secret surveillance (if not all
secret governmental programs), but for the disclosures by former NSA
employee Edward Snowden that began in June 2013. One of
Snowden's most significant leaks was the existence and scope of the
so-called "PRISM" program, ostensibly undertaken pursuant to
section 702. Quoting Oregon Senator Mark Udall, the front-page
Washington Post article disclosing the program noted that "there is
nothing to prohibit the intelligence community from searching
through a pile of communications, which may have been incidentally
or accidentally been collected without a warrant, to deliberately search
for the phone calls or e-mails of specific Americans."
7 5
Together with later disclosures,76 the PRISM story appears to
indicate that the surveillance of which the plaintiffs complained in
Clapper was "certainly impending"; indeed, it was already afoot. In
light of Clapper, the question then turned to how such surveillance
might be subjected to greater judicial review.
73Id. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 116o ("[W]e need only assume that the
Government is doing its job (to find out about, and combat, terrorism) in order to conclude
that there is a high probability that the Government will intercept at least some electronic
communication to which at least some of the plaintiffs are parties. The majority is wrong
when it describes the harm threatened plaintiffs as 'speculative."').
741d. at 1165; see also id. at 116o ("[F]ederal courts frequently entertain actions for
injunctions and for declaratory relief aimed at preventing future activities that are
reasonably likely or highly likely, but not absolutely certain, to take place. And that degree
of certainty is all that is needed to support standing here.").
75 Gellman & Poitras, supra note 9; see Clapper at 116o ("Even when the system works just
as advertised, with no American singled out for targeting, the NSA routinely collects a great
deal of American content. That is described as 'incidental,' and it is inherent in contact
chaining, one of the basic tools of the trade.").
76 See supra note 1o and accompanying text.
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II. THE CLAPPER "Fix"?: LOWERING THE STANDING BAR BY STATUTE
A. FISA After Clapper
Notwithstanding Snowden's disclosures, the government has
continued to argue in analogous contexts that the Supreme Court's
Clapper decision militates against standing to challenge the
government's secret surveillance programs. Thus, in the ACLU's
challenge to the bulk metadata collection program under section 215
of the USA PATRIOT Act, the government has continued to contest
standing despite the disclosure of orders by the FISA Court
compelling telephone companies like Verizon to turn over their
business customers' telephony metadata in bulk. Specifically, the
government's argument is that the alleged constitutional violation-
and, therefore, the Article III injury-does not arise from the
collection of the metadata, but only from its querying. And because
plaintiffs can only demonstrate that their metadata are being collected
(and not that they are being queried), they cannot overcome
Clapper.
77
Whatever one thinks of such a distinction as a logical matter, the
larger legal point that it underscores is the exceptionally high bar
Clapper imposes before plaintiffs will be able to challenge secret
government surveillance programs going forward. Indeed, even if
courts subsequently conclude, contra the government, that the injury
occurs at the point of collection, that still assumes that future
plaintiffs will be able to prove that such collection is occurring-a
difficult proposition at best in the absence of additional Snowden-like
disclosures or far greater volitional transparency on the part of the
government.
At the same time, one of the more underappreciated features of
FISA is the cause of action it already provides for an "aggrieved
person" "other than a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power [as
defined by FISA], who has been subjected to an electronic
surveillance. 78 FISA proceeds to define "electronic surveillance"
somewhat convolutedly, 79 but it nevertheless manifests Congress's
77See ACLUMotion to Dismiss, supra note 14. But see supra note 15 (citing two district
court decisions rejecting the government's argument, and upholding the standing of
different Verizon customers to challenge the telephony metadata program).
78 50 U.S.C. § i8io (2012); see also Fed. Elec. Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. i1, 19 (1998)
("History associates the word 'aggrieved' with a congressional intent to cast the standing
net broadly-beyond the common-law interests and substantive statutory rights upon
which "prudential" standing traditionally rested.").
79See 50 U.S.C. § 18oi(f).
2014]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
intent, from the inception of FISA, to allow those whose
communications are unlawfully obtained under FISA to bring private
suits to challenge such surveillance. 80 Simply put, Congress has
already created a private cause of action for FISA suits; it has just
never clarified how putative plaintiffs can demonstrate that they are,
in fact, "aggrieved persons."
B. Defining the Injury
With that in mind, suppose Congress enacted the following
language as new subsection (b) to 50 U.S.C. § 181o:
For purposes of any claim brought in any court of the
United States challenging surveillance conducted
pursuant to this chapter, an "aggrieved person" is any
person or entity (other than a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power) who can demonstrate (i) a
reasonable basis to believe that their communications
will be acquired under this chapter; and (ii) that they
have taken objectively reasonable steps to avoid such
surveillance. 81
At first blush, such language should largely ameliorate the Clapper
problem. After all, one can hardly conclude that the Clapper plaintiffs'
concerns were unreasonable given the language of the statute as it
was enacted-and especially after and in light of the Washington
Post's Snowden-aided disclosure of the PRISM program. To similar
effect, the Clapper plaintiffs had indeed undertaken objectively
reasonable steps to avoid such surveillance-by pursuing alternative
(and more expensive) means of communicating with non-citizens
80 In Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Obama, 705 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2012), the
Ninth Circuit held that Congress, in creating the cause of action provided by § i8io, was
insufficiently clear that it intended to waive the federal government's sovereign immunity,
and so § i8io did not authorize suits for damages against government officers in their
official, as opposed to individual, capacity. Leaving aside the questionable logic of the
court's analysis, it should not disturb the availability of § 18io for suits for declaratory or
injunctive relief (and Congress could also overrule Al-Haramain if it were to enact the
language proposed above).
81 For an earlier variation on this theme, see Steve Vladeck, The Clapper Fix: Congress and






outside the territorial United States. It should not even be a close
question whether the Clapper plaintiffs could satisfy such a statutory
standing provision.
The harder question is whether such a provision would be
constitutional. In his Clapper dissent, Justice Breyer seemed to
suggest that the answer would be yes: "[W]hat the Constitution
requires is something more akin to 'reasonable probability' or 'high
probability.' The use of some such standard is all that is necessary
here to ensure the actual concrete injury that the Constitution
demands., 83 And, per the above discussion, Justice Kennedy's Lujan
concurrence and subsequent opinions appear to support Justice
Breyer's view inasmuch as they underscore his view of Congress's
power to "articulate chains of causation." So long as Congress is not
creating standing for what is (1) effectively a generalized grievance;
84
or (2) a procedural right without a substantive deprivation," Justice
Kennedy appears to share the view of the Clapper dissenters-and
would therefore likely uphold such a potentially expansive standing
provision.
C. The Potential Shortcomings of a Clapper Fix
Ultimately, the larger problems with such a Clapper "fix" are not
legal, but practical: For starters, there is little reason to believe that
disclosures of programs such as PRISM are going to become a
recurring feature of American public discourse-or even that we now
know about all of the potentially unlawful secret surveillance to which
U.S. persons are currently being subjected. And to the extent that
current or future programs are based upon statutes not remotely as
clear in their potential scope as section 702, the absence of such
82See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1145-46 (2013).
83Id. at 1168 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
84 For potentially nationwide surveillance such as the bulk metadata and PRISM programs,
it is certainly true that any constitutional "injury" is widely shared. Standing alone, though,
that fact does not raise generalized grievance concerns: "Often the fact that an interest is
abstract and the fact that it is widely shared go hand in hand. But their association is not
invariable, and where a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has found
'injury in fact."' Fed. Elec. Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (citing Public Citizen v.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1989)).
85 Where the claim is unlawful interception of the plaintiffs communications, this concern
is not presented. It does arise, however, in the context of allowing other parties to challenge
government surveillance programs at least nominally on the public's behalf. See infra Part
III.
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disclosures would likely be fatal to the ability of plaintiffs to satisfy
even the lower standing threshold proposed above. Simply put, such a
Clapper fix may well be constitutional, but it may also not accomplish
much outside the specific context of challenges to section 702.
The same logic would also presumably result if the government
succeeds in its efforts to distinguish between the collection of
information from U.S. persons and the querying of that information,
an argument that has been publicly aired only in district court briefs
thus far.86 If the relevant injury for constitutional purposes does not
arise from the government's obtaining of an individual's data and/or
communications, but rather its specific accessing thereof, even the
language outlined above may well prove inadequate to allow a putative
plaintiff to establish that a current or future secret surveillance
program is in fact injuring them.87
Finally, there is the matter of the elephant in the room: it would
logically defeat the purpose of secret surveillance programs if those
programs could be challenged in visible, public litigation in which
plaintiffs could presumably seek to discover information concerning
the existence and scope-and sources and methods-of the
government's surveillance. Whether or not the government would be
entitled to avail itself of the state secrets privilege in such cases,88 the
86 See ACLU Motion to Dismiss, supra note 14.
87 Although the district court in Klayman v. Obama rejected the government's effort to
draw this distinction, it also held that the plaintiffs in that case had standing to challenge
the NSA's querying procedures, as well. As Judge Leon explained, 'The
Government... describes the advantages of bulk collection in such a way as to convince
me that plaintiffs' metadata-indeed everyone's metadata-is analyzed, manually or
automatically, whenever the Government runs a query using as the 'seed' a phone number
or identifier associated with a phone for which the NSA has not collected metadata (e.g.,
phones operating through foreign phone companies)." Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d
1, 28 (D.D.C. 2013) (footnote omitted).
88 At least one district court has held that the cause of action provided by FISA, see 50
U.S.C. § 18io, necessarily abrogates the state secrets privilege in cases brought under that
provision. See In re Nat'l See. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 70o F. Supp. 2d 1182
(N.D. Cal. 20o), aff d in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nora; Al-Haramain
Islamic Found. v. Obama, 705 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2012). The Fourth Circuit, in contrast, has
held that the state secrets privilege is constitutionally grounded, see El-Masri v. United
States, 479 F.3d 296, 303 (4th Cir. 2007) ("Although the state secrets privilege was
developed at common law, it performs a function of constitutional significance, because it
allows the executive branch to protect information whose secrecy is necessary to its
military and foreign-affairs responsibilities."), which would militate against Congress's
power to abrogate it. Cf. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, 725 F.3d 197 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (striking down a statute on the ground that it interfered with the President's
exclusive constitutional authority over foreign relations), cert. granted, No. 13-628, 2014
WL 1515718 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2014).
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possibility of such disclosure-through-litigation provides still further
reason to doubt that "fixing" Clapper is a workable, complete, and
comprehensive solution-at least on its own.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE: SPECIAL ADVOCATES AND
APPELLATE STANDING
A. FISA 's "Adversarial" Process
The inadequacies of external civil litigation may help to explain
why so much attention has increasingly come to focus on the
procedures before the FISA Court itself-especially the possibility of
improving upon and expanding mechanisms for adversarial
participation before the court as a means of increasing accountability
for secret government surveillance programs. 89 This point may seem
counterintuitive; as initially conceived, FISA was designed explicitly to
not be adversarial, but to instead resemble the exparte and in camera
warrant process Congress codified in the context of wiretap
applications in ordinary criminal cases. 90 Indeed, the lack of
adversarial process led some-including future Court of Appeals (and
FISA Court of Review) Judge Laurence Silberman-to argue that such
proceedings might even violate Article III insofar as they effectively
sought advisory opinions from the FISA Court. 91
In ordinary criminal cases, federal courts have long upheld the
non-adverse nature of warrant applications by indulging something of
a fiction-that the warrants are ancillary to a judicial process that will
eventually culminate in an opportunity for adversarial presentation of
89See, e.g., James G. Carr, A Better Secret Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2013, atA21; see
also, Stephen I. Vladeck, It's Time To Fix the FISA Court (the Way Congress Intended),
MSNBC (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/its-time-fix-the-fisa-court-the-
way.
90 See, e.g., United States v. Koyomejian, 946 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[I]n draffing
FISA Congress used Title III as its model, particularly for procedures relating to necessity
and minimization."); see also S. REP. NO. 95-604 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3904.
91 See Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance: Hearings on H.R. 5794, 9745, 7308,
and 5632 Before the Subcomm. on Legislation of the Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 221-23 (1978) (statement of Laurence H. Silberman).
See generally ANDREW NOLAN ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., INTRODUCING A PUBLIC ADVOCATE
INTO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT'S COURTS: SELECT LEGAL ISSUES 19
(2013) (summarizing the constitutional issues surrounding FISA), available at
http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/1o/CRS- Report- FISC- Public- Advoecate-
Oct.-25-2013.pdf.
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the issues, e.g., in a motion to suppress the fruits of the warrant
during a criminal trial, or a civil suit for damages challenging the
legality of the search conducted pursuant to the warrant. 92 Insofar as
the FISA process was at least initially modeled on a similar
understanding, then, the argument goes that FISA satisfies Article III
to the same extent as the warrant process in ordinary criminal cases.93
Even if that analogy works, though, it fails to account for the
fundamental shift in the nature of the judicial review the FISA Court
conducts under some of the government's newer FISA authorities. For
example, neither the production orders the government may obtain
under section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act nor the directives that
issue under section 702 are even plausibly characterized as "warrants"
based upon individualized probable cause determinations. Both are
more tantamount to administrative orders directed to third parties-
based not upon any individual suspicion, but rather upon the utility of
such bulk collection. Nor is it conceivable (let alone likely) that a
statistically significant percentage of the information obtained under
these authorities will ever be subject to collateral attack in a criminal
or civil proceeding. Perhaps because the adverseness fiction breaks
down in these contexts, the statutes creating these authorities also
provide-for the first time-for the possibility of adverse litigation
before the FISA Court.
To that end, section 215 authorizes "[a] person receiving a
production order" under that provision to "challenge the legality of
that order, '94 and to seek review in the FISA Court of Review (and,
92 See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb-A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, iio6 n.663 (2OO8).
93See, e.g., United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 118o, 1196 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); see also
United States v. Falvey, 54o F. Supp. 13o6, 1313 n.16 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). A different
argument, and one offered by the FISA Court of Review in 2002, is that the judges of the
FISA Court are not actually exercising judicial power at all when they are approving
government applications, and so are not bound by Article III's case-or-controversy
requirement. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 31o F.3d 717, 732 n.19 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002); see
also NOLAN ET AL., supra note 88, at 16-17. Such an argument utterly fails to persuade. For
starters, the FISA Court has itself held that it is an Article III court. See In re Motion for
Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 486 (FISA Ct. 2007) ("Notwithstanding the
esoteric nature of its caseload, the FISC is an inferior federal court established by Congress
under Article III."); see also United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 791-92 (9th Cir.
1987) (Kennedy, J.). Moreover, its decisions are subject to supervisory appellate review by
the FISA Court of Review and then the U.S. Supreme Court. Insofar as the FISA process
could be justified as existing outside of Article III, having "initial" Article III review in the
U.S. Supreme Court would appear to contravene the limits on that Court's original
jurisdiction as articulated in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
9450 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(A) (2012).
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ultimately, in the Supreme Court), if they are unsuccessful.95 And
section 702 authorizes "[a]n electronic communication service
provider receiving a directive" under section 702 to "file a petition to
modify or set aside such directive with the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, '96 on the grounds that "the directive does not meet
the requirements of this section, or is otherwise unlawful., 97 As with
section 215, section 702 further authorizes appeal to the FISA Court of
Review, and then the Supreme Court, of adverse decisions. 98
Both sections also include a panoply of procedural rules in such
cases-designed to ensure both the expediency and secrecy of such
adversarial process. 99 Presumably, the animating principle behind
both provisions is that such adversarial participation can
simultaneously (1) ameliorate the Article III questions that FISA
might otherwise raise; and (2) allow for at least some adversarial
presentation and argument on the relevant legal principles.
One can certainly question whether the recipients of directives
under section 702 or production orders under section 215 are in a
position meaningfully to vindicate the rights of those whose
communications are actually being acquired as a result. 100 But there is
an even more basic problem: According to a July 2013 letter from
Judge Walton to the Senate Judiciary Committee, 10 1 no third-party
had, to that point, ever availed itself of either of these adversarial
processes-under section 215 or section 702.102 Thus, even if
951d. § 1861(f)(3).
961d. § 1881a(h)(4)(A) (2012).
97See id. § 1881a(h)(4)(C).
98 See id. § i88ia(h)(6).
99 See id. §§ 1861(f)4), (5), 1881a(h)(4)(D)-(F).
1oo Indeed, the interests of a telephone or internet service provider will necessarily diverge
from the interests of at least some of their customers, especially given that (i) the
provider's cooperation with the government is ostensibly secret; and (2) non-cooperation
will potentially incur significant economic (and non-economic) costs arising out of the
litigation, whereas cooperation is reimbursed. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(2) ("The
Government shall compensate, at the prevailing rate, an electronic communication service
provider for providing information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with a directive
issued pursuant to paragraph (i).
101 See Letter from Hon. Reggie B. Walton, Presiding Judge, FISC, to Hon. Patrick J. Leahy,
Chairman, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, at 8-9 (July 29, 2013), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fise/honorable-patrick-leahy.pdf.
102 At the time of Judge Walton's letter, the only public record of a wholly adversarial
proceeding before the FISA Court came under the now-defunct Protect America Act of
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recipient-based adversarial process could provide a sufficient check on
secret government surveillance programs, at least thus far, it clearly
has not done so.
B. The "Special Advocate" Proposals
This shortcoming may help to explain the growing support for
proposals to have some kind of "special advocate" participate in at
least some cases before the FISA Court. 103 Although the details vary,
the basic gist is that Congress would create an independent office
staffed by (or a rotating panel of court-designated private) lawyers
empowered to appear in at least some cases before the FISA Court,
specifically tasked with arguing against the government's
interpretation of the relevant statutory and constitutional authorities.
Such lawyers would have appropriate security clearances-allowing
the FISA Court to entertain such arguments in secret-and, under




Instead, their statutory obligation would be to play the devil's
advocate-to assist the FISA Court by providing alternative possible
readings of the same procedural, evidentiary, statutory, and
constitutional language on which the government has rested its
application. 105
At least with regard to proceedings before the FISA Court, the
creation of a "special advocate," however conceived, should not raise
any new Article III concerns (if anything, it should mitigate existing
constitutional objections with respect to the absence of adverseness
2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, § 2,121 Stat. 552, 554-55 (formerly codified at 50 U.S.C. § 18o5b
(2oo8)), and culminated in the FISA Court of Review's 2008 decision in In re Directives
[Redacted] Pursuant to Section lo5B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d
1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008). As we now know, Yahoo! was the adversarial party in that case.
103 See, e.g., Carr, supra note 89.
104 It should follow that, if the "special advocate" was tasked with representing U.S. persons
who are subject to FISA Court-approved surveillance, then the only Article III issue would
be the post-Clapper standing question addressed in Part II, and the adverseness and
appellate standing issues discussed herein would be moot.
105 For two of the more comprehensive proposals in this regard, compare the FISA
Accountability and Privacy Protection Act of 2013, S. 1215, 113th Cong. (2013), and the
FISA Court Reform Act of 2013, S. 1467, 113th Cong. (2013). See generally Mark M.




before that Court). 10 6 Assuming arguendo that these disputes already
comport with Article III's justiciability requirements, it is difficult to
see how adding a new party in suits initiated by the government as
plaintiff would raise any new concerns. Although reasonable people
will certainly disagree about the wisdom of competing "special
advocate" proposals as a matter of policy, it is difficult to dispute their
validity as a matter of law-at least in proceedings before the FISA
Court. 1
C. Standing to Appeal
Where things get tricky-and where Article III standing doctrine
would again rear its jurisprudential head-is if and when the special
advocate loses before the FISA Court, and seeks to appeal an adverse
decision to the FISA Court of Review. After all, parties must have
Article III standing not just at the beginning of a suit (which exists in
the FISA context thanks to the government's role), but also in order to
appeal adverse decisions. 1°8 In the context of appellate standing, the
Supreme Court has held that such standing can arise merely from an
adverse (or even satisfactory 1°9) decision below-but only so long as
that decision caused a specific and concrete injury to the party seeking
to appeal. 110
Consider, for example, the Court's June 2013 decision in
Hollingsworth v. Perry-the case challenging California's ban on gay
marriage, "Proposition 8."111 In Perry, there was no question that the
plaintiffs had standing in the district court to challenge Prop. 8 on
federal constitutional grounds. But once the district court ruled in
their favor, the state declined to appeal. Instead, a group of
proponents and local government officials who had intervened in the
district court sought to challenge the district court's decision on
1o6 See Marty Lederman & Steve Vladeck, The Constitutionality of a FISA "Special
Advocate," JUST SECURITY (Nov. 4, 2013 1:34 p.m.),
http://justsecurity.org/2013/11/04/fisa-special- advocate-constitution/.
lo7See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, The Case for a FISA "Special Advocate," 42 PEPP. L.
REv. (forthcoming 2015) (summarizing and assessing the competing proposals, and
defending one specific variation as the best way forward).
108 See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997).
log See, e.g., Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2028-33 (2011).
110 Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986).
111 33 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
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appeal. 112 Writing for a 5-4 majority (that did not include Justice
Kennedy), Chief Justice Roberts held that the proponents lacked
appellate standing:
To have standing, a litigant must seek relief for an
injury that affects him in a "personal and individual
way." He must possess a "direct stake in the outcome"
of the case. Here, however, petitioners had no "direct
stake" in the outcome of their appeal. Their only
interest in having the District Court order reversed was
to vindicate the constitutional validity of a generally
applicable California law.113
Rejecting the cases marshaled by Justice Kennedy's dissent, Chief
Justice Roberts concluded by stressing that "none comes close to
establishing that mere authorization to represent a third party's
interests is sufficient to confer Article III standing on private parties
with no injury of their own."114 And although the intervenors might
have been able to claim standing if they were acting as "agents" of the
state, it was clear from the record that no such agency relationship
existed. 5
Dissenting, Justice Kennedy suggested that the Chief Justice's
opinion was marked with "much irony. 1 16 After all, "A prime purpose
of justiciability is to ensure vigorous advocacy, yet the Court insists
upon litigation conducted by state officials whose preference is to lose
the case."'1 7 Indeed, as Justice Kennedy explained, "The doctrine is
meant to ensure that courts are responsible and constrained in their
power, but the Court's opinion today means that a single district court
can make a decision with far-reaching effects that cannot be
reviewed."11 8
112After certifying a question of state law to the California Supreme Court, see Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2011); Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002 (Cal. 2011),
the Ninth Circuit held that the intervenors did have standing. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d
1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2652.
113 133 S. Ct. at 2662 (citations omitted).
114Id. at 2665.
hasSee id. at 2666-67.





One could make similar arguments about appellate standing in the
context of a FISA "special advocate." Given the unique and effectively
non-adversarial nature of proceedings before the FISA Court, allowing
a special advocate would help to "ensure vigorous advocacy";
authorizing an appeal from an adverse decision would protect against
a scenario wherein "a single district court can make a decision with
far-reaching effects that cannot be reviewed." Once again, then, if the
question is simply whether Justice Kennedy would endorse standing
on such terms, the case law provides a fairly clear answer. And yet, if
Perry is taken at face value, then there may be five votes for the
contrary proposition-and for no appellate standing for a party like
the "special advocate" at the heart of many of the current FISA reform
proposals, unless it incurs a specific and concrete injury as a direct
result of an adverse decision by the FISA Court."'
D. The Unanswered Question: Congress and Appellate Standing
To be sure, Perry raised the question of whether states could
create an interest sufficient to confer appellate standing upon a party
not directly injured by the decision below. Another question, and one
not considered in Perry, is whether Congress could do so. As Justice
Kennedy pointed out in his Perry dissent, the Supreme Court has
previously recognized Article III standing for private parties to
prosecute criminal contempt and qui tam actions (in both of which
they are ostensibly proceeding on behalf of the federal government);
for "next friends" suing on behalf of the real party in interest; and for
shareholders in shareholder-derivative suits. o
And at least in the contempt, qui tam, and shareholder-derivative
contexts, those suits are pursuant to express statutory authorization-
authorization that arguably does not create the agency relationship
119 Congress could also sidestep the constraints on appellate standing by providing for
appeals qua judicial certification, as is currently the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1992)
for interlocutory appeals, and § 1254(2) for questions certified to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Although there is no authority addressing the extent to which Article III standing
principles apply to judicially certified questions, there is also no suggestion that an
appellate court would lack the power to answer certified questions from a lower court-
especially where, as here, that court was possessed of a live and adversarial dispute.
Congress might also borrow a page from the context of bankruptcy courts, where those
courts are allowed to act finally with regard to "core" bankruptcy matters, but may only
make recommendations (that must be confirmed by the district court) in "non-core"
matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2005). Although the specifics of these alternative approaches
are beyond the scope of this essay, the larger point they underscore is the array of options
potentially available to Congress beyond a direct statutory appeal by the special advocate.
'20Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2673-74 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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upon the absence of which the Perry majority appeared to base its
reasoning. 12 1 Thus, perhaps one way to reconcile these seemingly
divergent decisions is by concluding that Congress has-and would
have-greater latitude to confer appellate standing upon those not
directly injured by a lower-court decision than states do after Perry,
analogizing to the greater latitude Justice Kennedy would give (and
has given) to Congress after and in light of Lujan. Such an argument
might have especial force if Congress simultaneously vested such an
official with the responsibility to exercise some modicum of
independent federal authority.
In one sense, perhaps the most important takeaway from the
above analysis is the extent to which the Supreme Court's Article III
standing jurisprudence interposes substantial obstacles to judicial
review of secret surveillance programs (if not all secret government
conduct) on the merits. Yes, Justice Kennedy's Lujan concurrence
appears to leave more room for Congress to authorize challenges to
secret surveillance programs based on evidence that interception of
the plaintiffs' communications is reasonably likely, if not "certainly
impending." And yes, no Article III obstacle should prevent Congress
from expanding the scope and volume of adversarial participation in
matters before the FISA Court, even if Article III may present
difficulties in allowing such statutory adversaries to appeal adverse
decisions to the FISA Court of Review and, if necessary, the Supreme
Court. 122 Thus, those who seek reforms of the FISA process with an
eye toward increased accountability and oversight could certainly look
to these remedies as useful steps in that direction.
But if nothing else is clear, it should hopefully be obvious that a
truly comprehensive scheme for adversarial judicial review of secret
surveillance programs may in fact be unobtainable, at least without
sacrificing the very secrecy that arguably enables the success of such
governmental foreign intelligence activities.1 23 That is to say, absent
1211d. at 2666-67 (majority opinion).
122A though Judge Bates, among others, has raised policy concerns about expanded
adversarial participation before the FISA Court, most of those objections are focused on
such participation in "classic" FISA cases-i.e., individualized probable cause
determinations. See, e.g., Steve Vladeck, Judge Bates and a FISA "Special Advocate,"
LAWFARE (Feb. 4, 2014, 9:24 a.m.), http://www.lawfareblog.Com/2014/o2/judge-bates-
and-a-fisa-special- advocate/. Most now appear to agree that at least some additional
adverse presentation in bulk surveillance cases, including those arising under sections 215
and 702, is normatively desirable. See Vladeck, supra note 107.
123This point distinguishes the Guantfinamo detainee cases, for example, or proceedings
before the as-yet-unused Alien Terrorist Removal Court, see 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(F)
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some meaningful shift in the Supreme Court's understanding of the
constraints Article III's case-or-controversy requirement imposes
upon the adjudicatory power of the federal courts, or far greater (if not
mandatory) participation in the FISA process by those entities that
receive production orders and intelligence directives under the
statute, it may not in fact be constitutionally possible to provide in all
or even most cases for meaningful adversarial review. This does not
mean, of course, that Congress should not try to so provide to the
maximum extent feasible; if anything, it only underscores the extent
to which such review cannot-and, therefore, should not-be the sum
total of efforts to "reform" the foreign intelligence surveillance
activities of the U.S. government, at least for those who truly believe
that such reform is warranted.
(2001), in both of which security cleared counsel are authorized to represent the subjects
of the government's counterterrorism authorities. In those settings, the subjects are aware
of the government's general policies; they are merely not privy to that evidence relevant to
their case which is properly classified. See David Cole & Stephen I. Vladeck, Comparative
Advantages: Secret Evidence and "Cleared Counsel" in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Canada, in SECRECY, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND THE VINDICATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 173 (David Cole et al., eds., 2013). In the surveillance context, in
contrast, it would defeat the programs' purpose if the subjects of the government's secret
foreign intelligence surveillance activities were aware of those activities in the first place.
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